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Summary 
 
Sudan has always showed great potential in the poultry industry, but it has not been until now 
that this potential has blossomed and is growing quickly. As large agribusinesses
1are taking 
over the market shares within the urban areas, smallholders
2
 
 have been put out of business. 
They are not able to compete with mass production and lack financial assets to improve their 
production techniques. Contract farming is defined as initiatives from agro industrial 
companies to secure access to smallholder produce and has in developing countries become a 
way of allowing the poor to participate in a larger market (Farrington, 1999). 
The aim with this study was to investigate the suitability of implementing the contract 
farming concept within the poultry industry in Sudan today. The study is a qualitative field 
study and the authors have conducted qualitative interviews with respondents involved in the 
poultry industry in Sudan. For an overall perspective the respondents represented different 
parts of the poultry industry. The empirical results were later analysed in relation to the 
assumptions of agency theory. 
 
The results found imply that it would be difficult to introduce contract farming in Sudan’s 
poultry industry today. This is mainly explained by the agribusinesses unwillingness to take 
on more responsibility as they already are under stress because of government interference. 
Other findings are that the agribusinesses see no benefits from entering a contract agreement 
with a smallholder. The study also found that nor the smallholders did see much benefits other 
than financial from cooperation with the agribusinesses. Political issues cause problems for 
agribusinesses as well as smallholders, and have created a nervous society where 
independence seems to be the goal of each party.  
   
                                                            
1 Agribusiness refers to the various businesses that are connected with producing, preparing and selling farm 
product (www.dictionary.cambridge.org, 2012). 
2 Smallholder refers to farmers operating a farm of 2 ha or less (www.ifpri.org , 2007). v 
 
Sammanfattning  
 
Sudan har alltid visat stor potential för kycklingproduktion men det är först nu som denna 
potential tillåts blomstra och växer snabbt. Då stora företag tar över marknadsandelar i 
städerna, tvingas småproducenterna lägga ner sin verksamhet. De inte har möjlighet att 
konkurrera med massproduktion och saknar finansiella tillgångar för att förbättra sina 
produktionssystem. Kontraktsproduktion definieras som initiativ tagna av stora företag för att 
säkra tillgången till småföretagarnas produktion och har i utvecklingsländer varit ett sätt för 
småproducenter att nå en större marknad (Farrington, 1999). 
 
Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka lämpligheten att införa kontraktsproduktion inom 
fjäderfäindustrin i Sudan i dag. Studien är en kvalitativ fältstudie och författarna har 
genomfört kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter involverade i Sudans fjäderfäindustri. För 
ett helhetsperspektiv representerade de intervjuade olika delar av fjäderfäbranschen. De 
empiriska resultaten analyserades i förhållande till Agenteorins teorier. 
 
Resultaten antyder att det skulle vara svårt att införa kontraktsproduktion inom Sudans 
fjäderfäindustri idag. Detta förklaras främst av att de stora företagens ovilja att ta ett större 
ansvar, eftersom de redan är under stress på grund av regeringens inblandning. Dessutom ser 
de stora företagen inga fördelar med att ingå avtal med småproducenter. Studien fann även att 
även småproducenterna såg få förmåner utöver finansiella från samarbete med stora företag. 
Politiska problem gör det svårt för både företag och småproducenter och har skapat ett oroligt 
samhälle där autonomi tycks vara varje parts mål. 
 vi 
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1 Introduction  
 
The first chapter of the study firstly provides a problem background. Thereafter the problem, 
aim and delimitations of the study are presented as well as an outline of the work. 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
The republic of Sudan is located in the north eastern part of Africa. On the 9
th of July 2011, 
the country was divided into two regions due to political, economic and religious differences 
(www, Sida, 2011). Agriculture is the largest economic sector, in terms of contribution to the 
GDP and is the largest employer. Even if the agricultural sector has been demolished due to 
the oil industry, Sudan is still dependent on its agriculture since it stands for 40 percent of the 
GDP (Freiji, 2008). 
 
The world’s poultry production provides the human population with two main products: table 
eggs and broiler meat. Multinational agribusinesses
3
 
 have taken over the industry in the 
western world and are, step by step, penetrating the markets in developing countries as well. 
Also in Sudan, modern automatic control systems and record keeping are becoming the norm 
rather than the exception. As the economy is growing, urbanization from the rural areas 
towards cities is making people dependent on agro-industries which provide easy access to 
food (Freiji, 2008). 
Hagan and Tshumi (2005) explain economic growth as the most important contributor to 
poverty reduction. Economic growth   depends on effective markets for goods, services and 
commodities that operate effectively for everyone and basic services such as education, health 
care and water supply. Poor infrastructure and misinformation leads to noncompetitive market 
systems and in turn slows economic growth. In the absence of functioning market structures 
the smallholders’
4
 
 become vulnerable to volatile markets. Transaction costs that arise due to 
mistrust, information asymmetry and physical distance between buyer and seller typically 
exclude smallholders from participating in a larger market (Hagan and Tshumi, 2005).  
1.2  Problem 
 
The problem of market failure in Sudan depends on many factors that problematize the 
poultry industry.. In Khartoum, the agribusinesses are taking over the meat supply chain and 
putting smallholders out of business. Delgado (1999) describes four ways of overcoming 
market failure and establishing a functioning market so that smallholders are included in the 
market: First the smallholders need to gain access to land or financial assets, second they need 
continuous information about the market outlook and spot prices, third access to service, and 
fourth a functioning infrastructure as well as access to remunerative markets. 
One way of overcoming market failure is for smallholders to produce under contract for 
agribusinesses. This has been proven effective in several countries around the globe and is 
                                                            
3 Agribusiness refers to the various businesses that are connected with producing, preparing and selling farm 
product (www.dictionary.cambridge.org, 2012). 
4 Smallholder refers to farmers operating a farm of 2 ha or less (www.ifpri.org , 2007). 2 
 
seen as a way for smallholders to secure their income and for the agribusinesses to solve 
problems caused by government regulations (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).However, the 
outcome of a contract agreement is dependent on several factors such as government 
interference, power balances of the parties and possibilities of external contract enforcement 
(Sethboonsarng, 2008).These factors are critical issues that can destroy this form of 
arrangement with severe consequences for both parties (Key and Runsten, 1999).Where no 
safety nets are provided and an environment of mistrust has been established, people tend to 
be more risk averse and skeptical towards changes (Kontos, 1990). There will be no change as 
long as mistrust and skepticism is allowed to grow and infiltrate the market environment. But 
who is willing to risk and take the first step towards collaboration, and is collaboration wanted 
from all parties? What are the incentives for contract agreements and are the benefits 
considered worth the risk?  
1.3 Aim and delimitations 
 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the suitability of implementing the contract 
farming concept within the poultry industry in Sudan today. Another aim with this paper is to 
grow an interest for this form of production among market participants. Contract farming has 
not yet been introduced into the Sudanese poultry industry, although long used within other 
industries (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). The study is conducted with the following questions 
in mind:  
1.  How are the market participants affected and responding to the current changes in the 
Sudanese poultry industry in Sudan today? 
2.  Under which conditions is contract farming an interesting business opportunity for 
large agribusinesses? 
3.  How can agribusinesses  benefit from contracts with smallholders? 
4.  How would the agribusinesses provide assistance/benefits for the smallholders? 
5.  Under which conditions are smallholders interested in entering a contract agreement? 
 
Delimitations 
 
The project takes place in the Khartoum state in the northern part of Sudan. It is limited to a 
field study of how smallholders and agribusinesses perceive the contract farming concept and 
tries to identify the reasons for their perceptions. This study does not calculate potential gains 
for the implementation of contract farming. Moreover, it neither intends to practice the theory 
of contract farming by creating implementation schemes nor by setting future goals. 
 
1.4 Outline 
 
Chapter 1 begins by giving a brief introduction to the study, the problem background and the 
problem. The first chapter then continues by defining the aim and the delimitations of the 
study. The second chapter provides a theoretical framework for the study by explaining the 
agency theory as well as the contract farming concept. Under agency theory, the risk problem 
and the agency problem are discussed. The opportunities and challenges of contract farming 
are discussed in the second part of chapter.2. Chapter 3 outlines how the problem was 
approached and how data was gathered. The third chapter also identifies some of the 
difficulties of the project. The authenticity and reliability of the data collected are also 
discussed. Chapter 4 provides a background to the empirical study. The results of the 
empirical study are presented in chapter 5, while chapter 6 analyzes and discusses the results. 3 
 
Chapter 7 provides the conclusions drawn by the authors. Figure 1 illustrates the outline of the 
study.  
 
Figure 1.  Illustration of the outline of the study. 
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2 A theoretical perspective  
 
This chapter introduces the reader to different means to overcome market failure and explains 
why the authors choose to investigate the possibilities of contract farming. The second section 
explains the agency theory and what implies to the parties to enter a contact. The agency 
theory discusses the agency and the risk problem. The last part of the chapter explains the 
contract farming concept, as well as identifies common Opportunities  and difficulties of 
contract farming. Although there are several other theories such as the transaction cost theory 
and game theory, that could explain the situation in Sudan, the authors chose the agency 
theory since it is a theory that describes the functions and outcomes of contract agreements. 
By only focusing on the agency theory the study becomes more insightful. 
2.1 Means to overcome market failure 
 
This section gives a brief overview of a few common approaches regarding rural development 
and how market failures can be conquered. 
 
Every man on his own 
Even though the independent smallholders are free to choose every step in the production 
process, the choices are often limited to few options (Delgado, 1999). The traditional market 
is ruled by middlemen and small scale processors that act in their own interest by reducing the 
smallholders share and increasing final prices (Goldsmith, 1985). 
 
Cooperatives 
As smallholders have limited bargaining power, towards the government and agribusinesses, 
a smallholder group can strengthen the smallholders’ possibility to influence their 
environment (Sethboonsarng, 2008). Cooperatives in Africa can be problematic because of 
the moral hazard problems that arise when it is hard for the smallholders to control the 
management. Moral hazard is defined as a party’s actions to maximize its own benefits from a 
contract agreement in aspects where the other party does not have full insight (Holmstrom, 
1979). This can lead to inappropriate political activities, and financial problems (Delgado, 
1999).  
 
Out grower schemes on government land 
The Gezira scheme is one of the largest projects for agricultural production in the Sudan. It 
was established in the 1980s and lets local smallholders produce crops on governmental land 
under tenancy contracts. This solution is considered a way to solve land issues. The tenants 
are given restrictions regarding what crops to grow and also on payment to the government 
for inputs while they have complete responsibility for the management of the land. Moral 
hazard again becomes a major problem since the smallholders found ways to cheat the 
contract and prefer short term income to large term stability (Kontos, 1990). 
 
Large agribusinesses (plantations) 
In the future, independent agribusinesses will probably have problems to compete with 
contract farming solutions since it is politically less sustainable (Delgado, 1999). The large 
agribusinesses might provide some job opportunities but offer few growth opportunities for 
smallholders in the area as agribusinesses tend to act autonomously and exclusively 
(Goldsmith, 1985). 5 
 
Contract farming 
Contract farming is a well-established concept in developed countries and combines the 
benefits of large agribusinesses and smallholder production such as quality control, marketing 
and equity considerations (Glover, 1987). In the U.S. today almost all the poultry meat is 
produced under contract agreements. Similar examples are shown in France where contract 
production stood for over 80% of the meat produced in 1994 (Ramaswami, Prathap and Joshi, 
2005). In Germany contract farming stands for about 38 % of the production (Menard and 
Klein, 2004).  
 
Implementation of contractual production is also growing in developing countries around the 
world. Contract farming in South Africa is seen as a sustainable solution to avoid spot prices 
and 81% of the poultry is produced by contract farming or vertical integration (Sautier, 
Vermuelen, Fok and Biénabe, 2008). Although this form of production requires higher effort 
on part of the agribusiness in developing countries, studies have shown that it can be 
successfully implemented in Africa. In India contract farming is more cost efficient than non-
contract farming. As long as the agribusiness contracts low income smallholders, the 
agribusiness will be able to gain a large surplus from the produce (Rawaswami, Pratap and 
Joshi 2005). In both Bangladesh and India studies have shown that smallholders that produce 
under contract are better off with secured and higher income than non-contracted smallholders 
(Rawaswami et al, 2005; Begun, 2005). 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework -The agency theory 
 
The agency theory is based upon a two sided agreement where the principal
5 and the agent
6
 
 
are free to enter or leave the contract. In the case of contract farming, the agribusiness plays 
the role of the principal or sponsor that pays the smallholder, and the smallholder is the agent 
that completes a task that is agreed upon (Norrman, 2005). As illustrated in figure 2 the 
outcome of the contract is a product of the behavior of both parties. 
 Figure 2. Illustration of the concept of The Agency theory Source:(www,MAAW,2012) 
 
The theory focuses on the problems that arise due to opportunism
7
                                                            
5 In this study the agribusiness plays the role of the principal that hires the agent for a certain service. 
 and lack of human ability 
to be completely rationale. Norrman (2005) also states a few basic assumptions that affect the 
actions of both parties. Firstly, each party acts in its own interest, has its own goals with the 
contract and intends to get as much out of the agreement as possible. This is done at the cost 
6 The smallholder is referred to as the agent that agrees to perform under contract. 
7 Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile such as cheating and misleading (Hill, 1990). 6 
 
of the other party. Information asymmetry and different risk averseness are other sources of 
disagreement. The disagreements involved with contracts may lead the principal to control the 
agent in order to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s interest. The Agency and Risk 
problems are explained below in order to understand the outcomes of contracts and the 
reasoning of the parties. 
2.2.1 The Agency problem 
 
The Agency problem is based on two critical aspects that arise due to the goal conflict and the 
information asymmetry of the two parties: adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Information asymmetry arises because the principal is unable to identify the hidden 
competences, knowledge and actions of the agent (Saam, 2007). Even if the company is able 
to identify them, the costs of monitoring the actions of the agent are higher than the return of 
doing so. 
Moral hazard is described by Eisenhardt (1989) as a lack of effort on the part of the agent and 
depends on the principal’s ability to measure the results and the work effort of the agent. In 
contract farming, moral hazard may arise for instance when the agribusiness (principal) 
provides the smallholder with input such as seeds, and the smallholder (the agent) only uses a 
part of the input for the intended purpose and sells the rest to other smallholders. In such cases 
it is difficult for the agribusiness to control what has happened to the input.  
2.2.2 The Risk problem 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) also discusses the Risk problem that arises due to the difference in risk 
averseness of parties. Who is the most risk averse usually depends on the composition of the 
contract (Saam, 2007). There are two types of contracts, behavioral- and outcome-based. An 
example of a behavioral-based contract is a labor contract where the risk belongs to the 
company (Norrman, 2005). An outcome-based contract, on the other hand, transfers the risk 
onto the smallholder. The agent is more likely to behave in accordance to the contract when 
the contract is outcome-based or when the principal has sufficient information to verify the 
actions of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
2.2.3 Theoretical solutions to the problems 
 
There are, however, solutions for overcoming the agency theory problems, such as incentive 
compensation, monitoring systems, vertical integration, game theoretical solutions, self-
selection, signaling, bonding and screening (Saam, 2007). The assumption is made that it 
might be cost inefficient for the company to control every step of the smallholder’s work, 
even though the principal will always feel the need to monitor their agents more closely to be 
able to control and align the agents’ goal with their own. Knowing this, we choose to 
concentrate on incentive compensation systems, game theoretical solutions, bonding and 
vertical integration (Adams, 1996). 
Incentive compensation systems 
With an effective incentive compensation system, such as a well written contract, the goal of 
both parties’ will be to maximize production and cost effectiveness. An incentive 
compensation system is a good way for motivating both parties to work towards the same 
goal (Shapiro, 2005). 
Bonding 
Bonding refers to an agreement that binds the agent to a certain performance level. If the 
agent does not manage to fulfill or achieve this level, sanctions will reduce the compensation 7 
 
(Saam, 2007). In countries with questionable jurisdiction systems, such as Sudan, it might be 
hard to enforce contracts and opportunistic behavior can be a major risk factor 
(Sethboonsarng, 2008). 
Integration 
Smallholders can by provision of technical assistance improve their practices and in that way 
be able to provide the agribusiness with better meat. This, however, implies investment and 
training costs, and there is no guarantee that the recommendations will be followed in the long 
term. Nevertheless, Delgado (1999) argues that even though poultry production is well 
suitable for smallholdings and smallholders may need institutional support, vertical 
integration is probably not the best solution. 
2.2.4 Problems with the Agency theory 
 
Criticism towards the agency theory is mainly due to the fact that it is too general, and 
therefore, is inefficient in real life situations. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency 
theory is considered one sided because it has the ability to exploit potential workers. Other 
authors also state that it is not mathematically useful in the practical context of organization 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
2.3 Contract farming 
 
In this section, the concept of contract farming is explained. The Opportunities  as well as the 
Challenges are identified and brief explanations of different types of contract farming models 
are provided. 
2.3.1 Defining contract farming 
 
Contract farming is a way of allowing the poor to participate in a larger market (Farrington, 
1999). It can also be described as initiatives taken by agribusinesses to secure access to 
smallholders’ production (Coulter, 1999). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) define contract farming 
as an agreement between smallholders and processing or marketing firms for the production 
and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements at predetermined prices (Eaton 
and Shepherd, 2001). In other words, contract farming, when well administered, should 
benefit both parties and could be a way to overcome market failures such as information 
asymmetry and poor knowledge transfer. Contract farming gives smallholders in developing 
countries the possibility to develop their production through the assistance of the private 
sector.  For countries with political instability or poor financial assets this is positive since this 
development would require an enormous amount of public sector resources. (Sethboonsarng, 
2008).This would be positive for all parties as a form of large scale poverty reduction. 
Contract farming in developed countries includes a variety of different commitment levels 
from the agribusiness. In developing countries, the need for technical assistance provided by 
the agribusiness to the smallholder is usually higher (Sethboonsarng, 2008).  
 
2.3.2 Types of contract farming 
 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) divide contract farming into five different models. These are the 
centralized model, the nucleus estate model, the multipartite model, the informal model and 
the intermediary model. The model of an agreement is mainly defined by the objective of the 8 
 
contract. This in turn depends mostly on the type of crop, the smallholder’s knowledge and 
experience, as well as the type of resources that the agribusiness is willing to provide. 
Centralized model 
The centralized model can be defined as a large agribusiness engaging in a contract agreement 
with one or many smallholders. The sponsor, also known as the principal, usually buys the 
product, packages it and distributes it to the market. This model is mostly used in diary, 
poultry and tree crops businesses. It’s also vertically integrated; therefore, the quality and 
quantity of production is strictly controlled. The involvement of the principal varies in this 
model (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
Nucleus estate model 
In the nucleus estate model the principal owns and manages the entire production system in 
order to assure homogeneity of the produce. This model is mostly used for tree crops but 
some studies show that it can be effective for dairy, vegetable and fruit production (Eaton and 
Shepherd, 2001). 
Multipartite model 
The multipartite model usually involves government, statutory and private agribusiness 
working together with smallholders. Access to credit provision, production, and management, 
processing and marketing is through separate organizations. China is one of the countries that 
is known for working with the multipartite model, in which the government, township 
committees and foreign agribusiness have entered into a contract with local smallholders 
(Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).    
Informal model 
The informal model can be used by small firms as well as entrepreneurs who make simple and 
informal production contracts which are usually seasonally based, such as for vegetables and 
fruits. Material inputs and technical assistance is very limited, thus seeds and basic fertilizer is 
only what is offered. For this model to work successfully, support such as research and 
extension services need to be provided. This support is usually the responsibility of the 
government (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).  
Intermediary model 
The intermediary model is based on agribusinesses subcontracting crops to intermediaries e.g. 
large food agribusinesses  buy crop from a smallholder committee, which has a personal 
informal contract agreement with the smallholders. In this model, the sponsor (principal) must 
be aware of the loss of control over production and prices paid to smallholders (agents) by the 
middleman. In other words, it could lead to lower income for smallholders and bad quality of 
production for sponsors (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
 
2.3.3 Opportunities and challenges of contract farming 
 
Although contracts differ, common opportunities and challenges of the different parties are 
presented in table 1. Firstly, contract farming in developing countries usually means that the 
agribusiness provides the smallholder with inputs such as technical assistance or technology. 
Moreover, the smallholder is guaranteed fixed pricing structures and, through forward 
contracts, access to reliable markets as well as financial assets in the form of prepayment. 
Agribusinesses, on the other hand, should be interested in contract production since it is less 
likely to be subject of political criticism compared to large scale production. It is also a mean 
to overcome land constraints and for the agribusiness to become more cost efficient because 9 
 
of lower labor costs such as hiring, training and supervising personnel (Sethboonsarng, 2008). 
Another reason for agribusinesses to engage in contract farming is to be able to share risks of 
failure and secure the quality of the production (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
 
However, manipulation of quality standards by the agribusinesses to get the products at a low 
price is the most common problem for smallholders (Glover, 1984). An example of this is an 
agribusiness that paid its smallholders for the net-weight difference of an empty truck and the 
same truck loaded with birds. By cheating in the weigh-in of the truck, the agribusiness 
managed to pay less than agreed for the poultry. The smallholders ended up underpaid and 
defrauded (Haroldson, 1992). An investment may also mean an increased risk for the 
smallholder if the agribusiness is unwilling to share the risks of new technology (Eaton and 
Shepherd, 2001). These new techniques could also be unsuitable for the smallholders’ 
production or in the local social concept. The smallholder might also become dependent on 
the agribusiness, and although (s)he usually enters the contract freely, (s)he might find it 
difficult to leave the contract since most of the investments are made designed especially for 
contractual production (Key and Runsten, 1999). The agribusiness, on the other hand, must 
ensure the smallholders’ legal rights to the land, as well as take social and cultural constraints 
into consideration.  In order to be sustainable, a contract should not interfere with tradition 
and lifestyle in the area of operation (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). According to Kontos (1990) 
smallholders’ lack of commitment and sense of common purpose makes them unreliable as 
business partners. Therefore, a well written contract should contain clear and strong 
incentives for the smallholder to act in mutually beneficial ways. Eisenhardt (1989) states that 
these types of contracts are outcome based rather than based on behavior of the smallholder. 
 
Table 1: Opportunities and challenges of contract farming, (Delgado, 1999, Eaton and 
Shepherd, 2001, Sethboonsarng, 2008). 
  OPPORTUNITIES  CHALLENGES 
SMALLHOLDER     
  Access to markets  Manipulation of quotas 
  Increased incomes  Unsuitable technology 
  Secured price and buyer  Increased risk 
  New technology  Overreliance in advantages 
  Technical assistance  Corruption 
     
AGRIBUSINESS     
  Political acceptability  Social life & culture 
  Overcoming land constraints  Smallholders’ lack of commitment 
  Cost efficiency  Extra contractual marketing 
  Production reliability  Discontent smallholders 
  Quality consistency  Smallholders’ lack of common purpose 
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3. Method 
 
In this chapter the authors explain the research process. The scientific method and approach 
are described, followed by an explanation of how the data was collected. Finally, some 
complications and the quality of the study are discussed. 
 
3.1 Scientific Method and approach 
 
There are three different ways to approach a research problem; adductive, deductive and 
inductive (Perry, 1998). An empirical study is appropriate when trying to prove a theory or 
hypothesis (Kothari, 1985, 3).This study is a deductive empirical study where a theory is used 
to analyze the empirical results. In this study the agency theory is used to be able to identify 
and compare the results from the empirical study with the results of prior studies in the 
subject. 
This study is a field study based on a literature review and qualitative interviews. The method 
was used to get a deep understanding of the problem. The qualitative study is preferred when 
trying to explain people’s behavior (Kothari, 1985). Since the authors needed to introduce and 
explain the concept of contract farming to the respondents, personal meetings and qualitative 
interviews were preferable. Personal meeting give the possibility for discussions and 
explanations. The authors also assumed that higher quality data would be achieved through 
personal meetings.  
 
This method was preferred by the authors out of respect for the culture as well as to establish 
trust. One specific reason for this was to assure the respondents that the authors were working 
independently with neither affiliation nor responsibility to the government. This was found 
important for the respondents’ confidence and willingness to speak freely. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Figure 3 shows the steps in the research process taken by the authors to solve the problem.  
 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of the research process. 11 
 
The steps were chronologically followed starting with information gathering from secondary 
and primary information sources. When the data was gathered and summarised, the analytical 
phase started. Finally, a conclusion was drawn based on the data analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Collection of secondary data 
 
The study began with the collection of secondary data regarding contract farming, M4P
8
 
,and 
poultry production in general. Published scientific peer reviewed articles were obtained from 
Google scholar by browsing key words such as agency theory, contract farming, Sudan, 
poultry production, market failure and market for the poor. Regarding the poultry production 
in Sudan, Sudanese master theses that were found at the University of Khartoum were used. 
For a brief overview of the poultry sector and the specific characteristics of the area, 
secondary data was obtained from official reports from international organizations such as the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development 
program (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
Although several sources where used for the theoretical part as well as for the introduction 
part, the authors  are aware of the fact that some of the data might be outdated, especially 
because of the recent political changes in the Sudan. 
 
3.2.2 Collection of primary data 
 
Primary data is data that has been collected by the authors himself and that has not been 
published earlier (Glass, 1976). The empirical study is based on qualitative interviews with 
four university professors, the former vice president of agriculture and production manager at 
the Central Trading Company, two agribusinesses and 11 smallholders. The data was 
collected during a six weeks visit to the Khartoum state of Sudan in April 2012.  
 
3.2.2.1 Choosing respondents 
 
As the aim of the study is to get a wide picture of the current situation in the poultry industry, 
the respondents were chosen by their involvement in the industry. The initial aim was to 
interview only agribusinesses and smallholders, but as the study developed, it became clear 
that a more overall picture of the market failure in the Sudan was necessary in order to explain 
the deep mistrust from both parties. The universities in Khartoum helped with access to the 
first private poultry producers.; These poultry producers were regarded as very developed and 
modern by the authors why they were not classified as smallholders
9
3.2.2.2 Development of questionnaires 
. Since the authors also 
wanted to gather information from smallholders with poor financial assets, the authors tried a 
different method to reach the other smallholders. This method involved asking the 
smallholders themselves for neighbors and friends referrals within the poultry industry, and 
by doing so, smaller farms were reached. 
 
Initially, three different questionnaires were created, one for the university professors, one for 
the agribusinesses and a one for the smallholders. A forth questionnaire was later created 
especially for the government agency. Already after the first day of interviewing, 
approximately half of the questions were excluded to be able to complete the interviews 
                                                            
8 The M4P (market for the poor) approach is a way of reducing poverty and promote economic growth by 
making market systems more effective (Hagan and Tshumi, 2005). 
9 As seen above; Smallholder refers to farmers operating a farm of 2 ha or less (www.ifpri.org , 2007). 12 
 
within a reasonable time period. It was also noted that some of the questions were irrelevant 
for the study and that it took focus away from the key questions regarding contract farming 
and network relationships. Another reason for certain question exclusion was that the 
respondents often gave extended answers that included many of the questions. After the 
reconstruction of the questionnaires, the interviews took t 45 to 90 minutes per person 
interviewed depending on the respondent. Only two smallholders and one university professor 
were interviewed with the initial questionnaire, but already then some of the questions were 
merged together, thus why those questions will not be reported and analyzed. A few questions 
regarding cooperation network relationships were modified and added to better highlight the 
situation. The questions added were; 1) questions regarding the smallholders relationships 
with supplier and customer. The questions completely excluded were: 1) direct questions 
regarding the smallholders’ income; 2)questions regarding frequency of slaughter since all 
smallholders tried to slaughter at day 45 and 3) questions regarding the direct costs for inputs 
since these questions only took focus away from the main subject.  
3.2.2.3 The interviews 
 
The interviews were conducted at the University of Khartoum, the Veterinary College, a 
research center for poultry and at the agribusinesses head offices. In the introduction of the 
interviews, the authors presented themselves, the aim of the study and the concept of contract 
farming. The respondents were provided with a copy of the questions and a brief explanation 
of the contract farming concept in Arabic. Contract farming was also briefly explained orally, 
although some of the respondents were familiar with the concept. 
Dr. Omer Abdelwahab is former vice president of the Ministry of Agriculture and is currently 
production manager at the Central Trading Company supporting smallholders with technical 
knowledge of agricultural practice. With experience in business through governmental work, 
he has worked with both the Gezira scheme and the Agricultural revival plan
10
 
. These are the 
major agricultural changes attempting to enforce the Sudanese agricultural practices since the 
country independence in 1956. Therefore, Dr. Abdelwahab is expected to have good insight in 
governmental policies towards the agricultural sector. The intention with this particular 
interview was to obtain a government perspective of the situation. 
Dr. Adallah Khedir is currently the dean of the agriculture in Khartoum University. He did his 
undergraduate studies in the American university of Beirut and later concluded his PhD in the 
United States. 
Dr. Ibrahim Alnaeem is veterinarian specialized in poultry. He lectures at Khartoum 
University at the Faculty of Veterinarian Science. 
Dr. Ahmed Abdelgadir is a retired university professor in animal production with 
specialization in poultry production. Although pensioned, Dr. Abdelgadir is a volunteer 
consultant in the Research Center for Poultry Production in Khartoum. 
Dr. Ibrahim Abdelsalam Yousif is the dean of animal production in the Faculty of Agriculture 
at Khartoum University. 
The two agribusinesses that have been interviewed are Arabia and Shebeika poultry. 
Representing the agribusiness were Dr. Hassan Altigani, production manager at Arabia, and 
                                                            
10 The agricultural revival plan is a five year program that constitutes a national strategy for Sudan’s Agricultural 
Revival and covers matters such as land use as well as holding of livestock. (Nimir,2008) 
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Dr. Hashim Ahmed, technical manager at Shebeika. The agribusinesses’ together stand for 
about 32 percent of the country’s commercial poultry production and both are part of the six 
agribusinesses that drive or control the industry. Other agribusinesses  are Mico, Catreber, 
Ommat and Kuwaitea. Since the government is a shareholder in Mico and government 
interference was found to be a major problem for the free market, the authors were advised 
not to investigate its business although it alone stands for about 30% of the commercial 
poultry production. 
 
A computer, a notepad and a recording device were used to secure the information. As the 
tools were prepared during the introductions, the authors asked for permission to record the 
interview. All respondents agreed to being recorded, but if the interviews were interrupted, 
the recording device was paused out of respect towards the respondent. During the interviews, 
follow up questions were often discussed, and at the end of the interviews, informal chatting 
became the norm. During some of the interviews with the smallholder, a translator attended to 
make communication easier between the authors and smallholders. 
The research began with interviews and meetings with university professors and university 
based investigators in agriculture business and poultry. The main goal of these interviews was 
to obtain an overall picture of the poultry industry.  It was also presumed that the universities 
are able to speak more objectively about the current situation. A third reason for these 
interviews and meetings was to obtain information to smallholders and agribusinesses. The 
interviews and meetings were held at the University of Khartoum and Ahfad University for 
Women in the Omdurman region.  
Qualitative interviews were also conducted at the head offices of the two agribusinesses. 
These interviews were conducted in English. On a separate day from the interviews, a tour of 
one of the agribusiness farms was provided which gave the authors a deeper understanding of 
what had recently been explained. 
The interviews with the smallholders where mainly conducted in Arabic. These interviews 
took place at smallholder farms
11
 
 as well as at the University of Khartoum. Although, some of 
the smallholders were of the opinion that they understood the contract farming concept, a 
simple explanation of the concept and the questionnaires were provided in Arabic. A tour of 
the farm was sometimes provided. 
3.3 Complications 
 
3.3.1 The interviewer effect 
 
In face- to- face interviews, the interviewer is seen as the primary reason for errors in 
qualitative interviews. This is due to the known as well as unknown impact that the, 
interviewer has on the respondent. Social desirability is affected by the respondents as well as 
the interviewers’ age, race, gender and social status as well as by the interviewers’ 
expectations (O'Muircheartaigh and Campanelli, 1998). The authors realized that this might 
have occurred since some of the interviews were conducted through a translator. Overall, the 
agribusinesses and the respondents from the universities were eager to give extended answers. 
The authors at times had to read between the lines to try to understand the overall picture. 
During the interviews with one of the agribusinesses the authors noted that the answers were 
                                                            
11 This refers to smallholder farm 3,6,7 and  9. 14 
 
affected by the young age and the nationality of the authors. This was shown by the answers 
given, were vague motivations such as “this is Africa” or “in Europe things are different” 
were often used. The interviews with the smallholders were affected by the educational level 
as well as the nationality of the authors that expectedly made the smallholders more positive 
towards the contract farming concept. 
 
3.3.2 Time 
 
Time was the major problem that the authors had to deal with during the study. This was 
partly due to the culture and the problems of respecting the interview schedule as meetings 
were cancelled, postponed or opportunities suddenly appeared. This made planning difficult 
and catching the moment became the strategy to get in touch with the respondents. 
Misunderstandings because of different reference frames, culture and language were another 
issue that had to be conquered. Another problem was to get in touch with smallholders. This 
was due to the fact that the universities began by providing the authors with large 
smallholders with growth potential and modern systems. This is assumed to be because of the 
close relation that these smallholders had with the universities, being research farm.  
 
3.4 Reliability, validity and authenticity of the results 
 
The reliability of research results is one of the major problems of a qualitative interview. 
Misunderstandings and inability of the authors to judge the reasonability of the responses 
increase with a poor background knowledge of the subject (Gysin, 2010). In this study, the 
authors had a better understanding of the theoretical concept of the study while the 
respondents had a higher knowledge of the production process and technical data. Following 
each interview, the authors gained more knowledge and were able to include more relevant 
questions. The respondents also believed that their understanding of the situation developed 
and the authors found it easier to identify and judge the reliability of the information given as 
the interview progressed. Although the credibility could have been increased by letting the 
respondents take part in the interview summaries to confirm the understandings, this was only 
partly accomplished because of the limited amount of time to complete the study. 
Validity is the evaluative judgment of a study’s interpretability, relevance and score utility 
(Messick, 1988). Because of the changing market conditions for poultry producers in Sudan 
today, the study is considered to be relevant in time. Contract farming is considered a possible 
solution to overcome market failure in several developing countries today (Sautier et al, 
2008). The study also provides an understanding of the poultry producers’ perceptions of 
cooperation and business relations in Khartoum state. The results found could be used by 
poultry producers that are interested in developing their businesses. The study can also 
provide entrepreneurs interested in entering the growing Sudanese poultry production 
industry, with knowledge of the current market situation. The study is restricted to the 
Khartoum state of Sudan. The characteristics of the Sudanese market failures are considered 
similar to other African countries. Because the study is limited in scope, different production 
systems were not represented in the results.  
The authenticity of the sources could be a problem since the respondents were not consulted 
for a final verification of the conclusions of the interviews. This is partly due to language 
problems with translation and illiteracy, as well as time constraints. Since this has not been 
done, there is a possible risk of misunderstandings and misinterpretations by the authors. 
Other problems that could reduce the authenticity of the study are relations to the government 15 
 
in which some of the respondents did not feel completely comfortable expressing critique 
towards their government. 
Although unstructured interviews gave the authors the possibility to ask follow up questions, 
this method makes the comparison between individual respondent answers more challenging 
(Kothari, 1985).   16 
 
4. Empirical background 
 
This chapter provides information about Sudan and the country’s poultry production. Factors 
affecting the outcome of the production and the production forms are identified and briefly 
described. 
 
 
4.1 The Republic of Sudan  
 
As mentioned previously Sudan is located in the North East of Africa as you can see in the 
picture below. The climate varies between tropical in the south and dessert in the north. 
Depending on the time of the year, the average daily temperatures vary between 22.8 to 37 
degrees (Alhusain, 2005). The country itself is very dry with few rain periods and an annual 
precipitation of 121, 4 mm (Alhusain, 2005). Sudan is rich in natural resources, but is still 
considered to be a poor country due to underdevelopment, conflicts and political instability 
(www, UNDP, 2012). Since 1970, 90% of the Sudanese land is owned by the government 
(www, FAO, 2012). In irrigated areas, land has commonly been surveyed and registered, and 
the government leases it to tenants and private entrepreneurs by individually designed 
contracts. The land used for pasture and subsistence cultivation is unregistered and 
communally owned under customary land laws (FAO, 2005).  
 
Figure 4. Map of Sudan (www,IOM, 2012.) 
 
4.2 Poultry production in Sudan 
 
 
Although the poultry production in Sudan is promising, it is still a business with much room 
for improvement. During the last decade, the annual production of broiler meat has been 
steadily rising from 16000 metric tons in the 1980 to about 30 000 metric tons in 2002, with 
an annual growth rate of 3% (FAO, 2005). The growing population together with the GDP 
income per capita has increased the demand for meat. In 2008, about 3640 Sudanese poultry 
producers were registered, although many smallholders are presumed not to be listed (Freiji, 
2008). In 2002, the Sudan had a net import of 490 000 live chicks and the number of birds in 
the country was estimated to 45, 3 million (Ahmed, 2009). 96% of the commercial poultry 17 
 
production is located in the Khartoum state of Sudan. This could be explained by the 
continuous urbanization from rural areas to the cities, implying a future rising market demand 
in this area. However, Sudan remains the Arab country with the lowest intake of poultry meat 
per capita a year. In 2005, the intake of commercially bread poultry was 0, 77 kg of meat per 
capita which can be compared to Egypt with 9 kilos per year or Saudi Arabia with a yearly 
intake of 39 kg of poultry meat per capita (Freiji, 2008).  
 
The low intake of poultry in Sudan can be explained by the price of meat. Traditionally, the 
price of red meat from sheep and cattle has been low, but during the last decade, a rise has 
been noted. In the past, poultry meat production has been dependent on the importation of 
production inputs such as feed, vaccines and parent stock (Freiji, 2008). As the industry is 
growing and the agribusinesses establish themselves, the agribusinesses tend to be able to 
produce chicken more efficiently. For Sudanese poultry producers, the cost of environmental 
regulation systems and feed are the two major expenditures affecting the producers’ final 
profit. Feed cost itself stands for 50-70% of the producers’ total costs. Depending on the 
production system used, air condition can be the second largest expense (Emmam and 
Hassan, 2010). These factors crucial role for the outcome of the poultry producers economies 
are explained further. 
 
Local production systems 
The Sudanese warm environment is the major factor that depresses productivity of the poultry 
in Sudan (Alhusain, 2005). Because of high electricity costs and poor financial assets, it is 
expensive to regulate the temperature in production facilities. An effective housing system for 
the chicks is the most efficient way to overcome these problems (Emmam and Hassan, 2010). 
There are currently four main poultry meat production forms in Sudan. These are traditional 
backyard breeding, open house systems, semi-closed systems and closed systems.  
 
Traditional backyard poultry farming remains a common way of securing the protein intake of 
the household (Emmam and Hassan, 2010). Domestic species are fed in open yards and their 
food source is low nutrition feed from ground scratch and household waste (Ahmed, 2009). 
This production form is not competing with the other forms of production and the record 
keeping is low. 
 
In Sudan, open house systems are still the most common way of producing poultry for a 
commercial market (Emmam and Hassan, 2010). This system consists of a metal-roofed 
enclosure fenced with simple chicken wire. The open house systems have long been the 
standard for 95% of poultry production farms in the Khartoum state (Emmam and Hassan, 
2010).  
 
Semi- closed systems are open house systems with air conditioning that manage to lower the 
temperature of the houses, usually 5-10 degrees. On a hot summer day in Khartoum this could 
still mean that the birds growth environment lies over 35 degrees which is about 10 degrees 
over an ideal growth environment (Emmam and Hassan, 2010). 
 
The modern closed system is the most efficient form of poultry production (Emmam and 
Hassan, 2010). These systems provide secure optimal circumstances for the birds regarding 
protection from cold, rain, wind, and hot sun (Alhusain, 2005). The closed systems are mainly 
used by the large poultry producers since they are expensive and require a high degree of 
technical inputs such as air conditioning and fans. 18 
 
Feed 
While agribusinesses import expensive but perfectly prepared concentrate and high quality 
grains from the international and the domestic market, smallholders are often solely 
dependent on locally grown grains (Emmam and Hassan, 2010). The local feed mainly 
consists of sorghum, ground nut cake and sesame seeds. Sudan is currently the only Arab 
country that is self-sustainable in its feed production, with the exception of concentrates 
(Freiji, 2008). 
 
Sorghum is a grass well assimilated to grow in dry and hot climates. It alone stands for about 
60% of the chicks feed intake in most African countries (www, IFAD, 2012). Although Sudan 
is well-equipped to feed its domestic market, pressure from the international market raises the 
price for sorghum, ground nut cake and sesame seeds. When the suppliers sell their products 
to the international buyers, the consequence is higher prices in the domestic market which has 
severe effects on the economy of the poultry producers. The price volatility is not only 
depending on international demand, but it is also depending on season instability. Storage 
problems are the reason why the sorghum price is three times higher at the end of the season 
than in the beginning (pers.comm. Abdelwahab, 2012). Moreover, unreliable rainfall, political 
instability and dysfunctional infrastructure harm the price stability in the country (www, 
IFAD, 2012).   19 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
In this chapter, the authors have summarized the findings from the interviews that were 
conducted with a governmental representative, university professors, agribusinesses and 
smallholders. 
5.1 A governmental perspective  
 
5.1.1 The role of the ministry in supporting agribusinesses 
 
Sudan has a large department of extension services that works to disseminate technology in 
all parts of the country. However, in the case of the smallholders that represent the majority of 
the agriculture in Sudan, the agricultural extension services is not acting as expected and less 
than what is desirable (pers.comm. Abderwahab, 2012).  
NGOs have good possibilities to solve the problems and the government has a positive view 
of foreign help according to Abdelwahab (pers.comm. 2012). Foreign investors that bring 
financial assets into the country by working together with the smallholders could be a possible 
solution to make the market work more efficient. 
5.1.2 The agricultural challenges 
 
Abdelwahab (pers.comm, 2012) mentions that the problem of low productivity could be 
explained by financing problems, lack of effective extension services, lack of technology 
assimilation and smallholders marketing costs. The government used to provide free seeds to 
be able to improve food security in the country but the opportunistic behavior on the part of 
the smallholders became a problem which was difficult to control. 
Weak extension services are a big problem since technology and knowledge transfer are 
critical factors in solving the problem of low productivity. There are many problems or 
factors that result because of   low productivity and the government is not doing enough to 
improve the situation for the smallholders. 
 For instance, financing is one problem for smallholders and efforts have been made by banks 
in cooperation with the government to introduce micro financing. Micro-financing is seen as a 
possible solution but it has been difficult to reach out to the smallholders. This is partly due to 
mistrust towards the institutions and partly due to high interest rates. In a situation like the 
current, when everyone is marketing for themselves, middlemen and wholesalers take 
advantage of the situation. Some middlemen make smallholders produce on credit to be able 
to make the in-prices higher. 
Volatility in feed price is a major challenge. The government does not have enough storage 
space to cover the market demand for grains. Smallholders usually store feed by burying it 
into the earth on the top of a hill (also called “Mucmura”), although silos and storage places 
would be preferred. 
Another problem, according to Abdelwahab (pers. comm, 2012) are land constraints and land 
laws. Approximately 90% of the land in the Sudan is government owned. The land is usually 
used for traditional agriculture without any rental contract. A smallholder might have been 
using the land for generations when an agribusiness arrives with a contract from the 
government and states its legal right to the land. Rental contracts are usually between 5-25 20 
 
years long, but the investment act is very beneficial for investors, and if you prove to be 
serious about the land use, the contract given can be for almost 99 years. Investors and rural 
people have conflicts about land tenure.  
5.1.3 Opportunities of the private sector 
   
The poultry business is growing; the price has risen from 6SDG
12
The Agricultural Revival Plan is an ambitious plan to make the Sudanese agricultural 
production more effective but has not been fully implemented due to country’s financial 
difficulties. The plan includes the improvement of infrastructure and water harvesting. During 
Abdelwahab’s time as the undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, the plan was 
inspected by the FAO, which considered it to be a splendid plan. ”If at least 60 % of the plan 
could be implemented, then it would have a great impact on the country” states Abdelwahab 
(pers.comm., 2012). The revival plan was put in implementation in 2007 and was anticipated 
to take five years to fully implement, but the time limit has already doubled since the money 
that was first promised never arrived from the Ministry of Finance. Only parts of the financial 
assets have been obtained. 
 to 20SDG per kilo during 
the last decade. Abdelwahab (pers. comm., 2012) also speaks of the market as being 
completely free. 
The Ministry’s policy towards the private sector is very positive and open- minded; however, 
smallholders are not thoroughly included in the industry because large and efficient 
businesses are preferred by the government. The government prefers large agribusinesses 
which conquer smallholders in both quality and price. The opportunities of the smallholders 
are good if they learn to use micro financing and if they obtain better extension services. 
There is also a new act making it possible for seven smallholders to register an agribusiness to 
cultivate their land as a business. The problem is still that “cooperation” is a frightening word 
in the Sudan. 
5.1.4 Challenges in the sector 
 
Cooperatives have many times failed in Sudan which has become a problem since no one 
dares to try it anymore. People, overall, tend to depend only on themselves and on their 
family.  Still, with better agricultural extension services and ongoing political instability, 
private solutions such as contract farming have to be the solution. It is too risky to depend on 
money from the government, but who will invest in contract farming and put financial assets 
into the agricultural sector in Sudan, asks Abdelwahab (pers.comm, 2012) 
Abdelwahab (pers.comm, 2012) shares several challenges that the agriculture sector faces 
currently: 
 
1.  Because of the war since 1955 and other problems little attention has been paid 
towards the agricultural sector. 
2.  It is crucial that the smallholder owns his own land. The problem is that the 
government does not care who is cultivating the land as long as it is being done 
efficiently. The smallholder should work on his own farm and obtain his own profit to 
be considered an interesting business partner. 
                                                            
12 1 SDG equals to 0,225 American dollars (forexticket.biz, 2012) . This implies that: 
6SDG = $1,35 
20SDG =$4,5 21 
 
3.  The government prefers to induct projects with tangible results such as building dams 
that everyone can see instead of investing in capacity building and teaching. Capacity 
building is not as popular in the sense that it is harder to show results.  
4.  Smallholders are poor, and therefore, prefer short term income rather than a larger 
income in the long run. Cash that is given might not go to agriculture. That is why 
inputs are given in form of tractors for example. 
5.  Cooperatives are needed. The problem is that cooperation is a well-known concept 
that has been given a bad name. One example of this is the Gezira scheme. A major 
problem with Gezira was the lack of administration and supervision. The situation has 
created anarchy where everyone is trying to cheat the each other. Also, since the 
supervisors and controllers are related to the families that own the poultry farm, a 
liability problem arise whether to help the family or the government. 
6.  Changes have to be implemented step by step which is often preferred by the 
government and the industries.  
 
 
5.2 Perspective from academia  
 
The university professors see poultry production as a growing industry with much potential. 
This is due to rising prices for red meat, as well as the economic development that is expected 
to lead to a rise in the demand for poultry. The per capita intake of the poultry and the 
increasing number of inhabitants are other contributing factor, Abdelgadir (pers. comm., 
2012).  
 
A problem in Sudan today is that the country used to be dependent on meat from the domestic 
breeds that are well adjusted to the conditions of the country. Since the rise of commercial 
broilers, international breeds have been imported. These breeds are not as well adjusted to the 
heat and are subject to local diseases which have raised the need for high technology 
equipment and medicine (pers.comm., Abdelgadir, 2012). 
 
5.2.2 Challenges  
 
Governmental policies regarding taxes on import and technical equipment are problems to 
overcome. Feed availability and volatile prices, especially in sorghum; raise the need for 
storage areas. The problem is that investing in storage is expensive, which in turn means that 
only the government and large agribusinesses are able to afford it. The agribusinesses prefer 
to produce their meat close to large cities since the main business opportunities are there. 
Transportation to other areas of the country is expensive since the meat has to travel in 
refrigerated vans (pers.comm., Yousif, 2012). 
The smallholders, on the other hand, face problems such as competition of the large 
agribusinesses  that tend to take over the markets in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri. Finding 
capital and financial assets is another problem identified by the professors. High interest rates 
often scare people away. At the moment smallholders in rural areas can still do well since the 
large businesses have not yet entered that market. Smallholders are also more sensitive to feed 
price volatility and are less resistant to overcoming changes and market fluctuations. Instead 
of protecting the smallholders, the government tends to favor the more efficient 
agribusinesses. Smallholders should also be provided with better extension services in the 22 
 
form of training and equipment since they play an important role in filling the supply-demand 
gap in the poultry industry. In open- and semi-closed production systems, the birds become 
more exposed to diseases brought from outside the farms. This in turn leads to more 
veterinary treatment which is also very expensive (pers.comm.,Yousif, 2012). 
The inefficient extension services provided is a problem especially for the smallholders. By 
training and obtaining knowledge the smallholders would be able to make their production 
more cost efficient. Overfeeding is an example of smallholders paying for low nutritious feed 
and later having to over-feed the poultry without gaining/obtaining ideal output. (pers.comm., 
Khider, 2012)   
5.2.3 Opportunities 
 
As long as the agribusinesses are able to finance investments, they have a rapidly increasing 
market to satisfy. There is no doubt that entering the poultry business involves great 
opportunities. If effective extension services would be provided the possibilities of the 
smallholders are still good in rural areas since the agribusinesses tend to concentrate their 
market to the urban areas as well. Smallholders still fill an important position in the market, 
especially in the rural areas (pers.comm., Khider, 2012). 
5.2.4 Contract farming 
 
Contract farming is greeted positively by the universities, and Abdelgadir (pers.comm, 2012) 
refers to contract farming structures in Saudi Arabia and Brazil where the agribusinesses 
provide the smallholders with input on credit and slaughter assistance. Alnaeem (pers.comm., 
2012)  sees contract farming as the only way for smallholders and agribusinesses to be able to 
coexist in the future. The agribusinesses are currently taking over the production market but 
are already faced with difficulties from the government. “The Sudanese government needs to 
find ways to produce the inputs inside the country since the business is becoming too risky 
when depending on imports and the need for foreign currency” says Abdelgadir (pers.comm., 
2012). 
 
5.3 Agribusiness perspectives 
 
Arabia and Shebeika produce their poultry under well- managed environmental conditions in 
modern closed production systems. Figure 5 provides a scheme for the agribusinesses 
production process .Veterinarians work at the farms and which have their own slaughter 
houses in close connection to the stables. After slaughtering, the meat is stored in chilled 
storage rooms until ready for packaging and transport. The agribusinesses ’ vans are also 
refrigerated to keep the best possible standard of the meat and so the transport can take place 
during any time of the day. Finally, the meat is sold to stores in the markets of Khartoum. 
Shebeika poultry has its own store that also sells the meat. The farms are located nearby the 23 
 
cities to facilitate transport costs and be able to meet the demand.
 
Figure 5. the production process of agribusinesses (own interpretation) 
5.3.1 Arab Poultry Breeding and Production Company 
 
Arabia Poultry Breeding and Production Company, was initially founded in Kuwait in 1983. 
It is a privately owned agribusiness with 42, 5 % of the stakeholders in Sudan, 12, 5% in 
Saudi Arabia, 12,5 % in Kuwait and 12% in Iraq. Arabia is one of the largest poultry 
producers in Sudan and has about twenty percent of the commercial market share. It currently 
provides jobs for 425 employers in the above mentioned countries. It is the only Sudanese 
poultry producer that is ISO 9001 certified (pers.comm., Altigani, 2012) 
According to Altigani, the main goal of the agribusiness is to increase the business. There is a 
plan to double the broiler production from 4,5 million tons to 9 million per year within a five 
year period. The development plan also includes being autonomous in terms of egg- and 
poultry feed-production. This involves investment plans where the hatchery will produce 
17 000 000 hatching eggs per year. 
5.3.1.1 The production process 
 
The production process starts in the breeding houses. 65% of the eggs are self-produced and 
35% are imported from breeders in Belgium, Holland and France. The eggs stay in the 
hatcheries for 21 days and are then transferred to the broiler houses until day 37-42. The 
slightly shorter slaughter age if compared to other producers (45 days) is explained by cost 
efficiency. This is due to the fact that the proportion of feed intake by the broilers is not 
justified by the increasing body weight after this time. Once slaughtered, the meat is stored in 
a shock freezer which is -40
oC to avoid contamination. After that it’s stored into a regular 
freezer before transportation the customers (pers.comm., Altigani 2012) 
The agribusiness imports feed mainly from Europe. Since the demand for poultry is much 
higher than the supply, the agribusiness chooses not to export. Arabia poultry sees a large 
potential for the growth of the domestic market since it expects the poultry demand to rise 
from 1,5 kg of meat intake per capita to about 9kg per capita (pers.comm., Altigani, 2012). 
5.3.1.2 External relations 
 
The relationship with the government is mainly through laws, taxes and controls that only 
include costs for the agribusiness. The agribusinesses do not cooperate nor does the 
government help or assist the agribusinesses. However, improved sorghum seed has been 
given to smallholders by the government as a resolution to improve the productivity of the 
grain in the country. Except for European agribusinesses , Arabia is not cooperating with any 24 
 
other agribusiness or organization. Although, it could consider having sister agribusinesses  
that would provide Arabia with cheaper inputs such as feed. (pers.comm., Altigani, 2012). 
5.3.1.3 Contract farming 
 
Contract farming is not considered an interesting business opportunity for the Arabia 
agribusiness. This is initially explained by the smallholders lack in biosecurity, but as the 
discussion moves forward, the authors also obtain other possible explanations for the negative 
response. The agribusiness has previously had bad experiences from interference with 
smallholders in the nearby areas and Altigani (pers.comm., 2012) is not happy with what has 
happened. 
“Smallholders always create problems for the agribusinesses . We tried to offer them 
assistance and part of our land as long as they took better care of their carcasses. Their 
current treatment of by-products is creating biosecurity risks for us. Nor do they respect our 
land (pers.comm., Altigani, 2012). 
5.3.2 Shebeika Poultry 
 
Shebeika Poultry was founded in 2002 by Abdelrahman Shebeika who is currently the general 
manager. The agribusiness started as a small business with only two broiler houses and has 
been growing rapidly. Now Shebeika has two big farms in the outskirt of Khartoum. Together 
these two farms cover about 512 hectares with a capacity of 300000 chickens and about 250 
employees.  
 
Shebeika’s goal is to develop a breeder and hatchery farm as well as to implement ISO 14000 
and 9001 quality standards. The agribusiness is importing one day old chicks from the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Shebeika’s main concern is to overcome hard currency from the 
market. To be able to concentrate on the production process instead of the currency issue, 
Shebeika has invested in breeder stables so that they can produce their own chicks and eggs 
(pers.comm. Ahmed, 2012). 
 
5.3.2.1 Production process 
 
According to Ahmed (pers.comm, 2012), the production process from the beginning to the 
end is organized so that the employees are divided into teams and each team has a task to 
accomplish. Before the new batch arrives the houses must be cleaned, and the equipment has 
to be maintained and ready to be used.  
 
The agribusiness has its own distributors in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahir to be able to 
reduce prices of the middlemen, and by having their own stores, Shebeika can decide over the 
price. Shebeika has its own refrigerated cars and all transport is done by the agribusiness. 
Shebeika is quality oriented, they have been awarded by the Khartoum poultry committee for 
having a fine end product (pers.comm. Ahmed, 2012). 
 
5.3.2.2 External relations 
 
The agribusiness have many obligations towards the government. It needs to renew their 
licenses for the two farms every year. It has to get permission from the Ministry of 
Agriculture on all of it imports. Local veterinarians have to inspect the slaughtering process in 
order to approve that the meat is safe for human consumption. Shebeika has only business 25 
 
relations with suppliers and buyers, but does not intend to deepen these relations into 
cooperation since autonomy is considered very important. 
 
Ahmed expressed a complicated relationship with the government. One of the problems is 
Mico and the unpredictable costs. In the year 2006 the government became a shareholder in 
Mico, and since then the agribusiness has grown to become one of the largest poultry 
producer in Sudan. By having the government as a shareholder, it has been easier for Mico to 
avoid some of the costs that are faced by the private agribusinesses and has therefore been 
able sell its meat for a much lower price than the rest of the poultry producers on the market. 
Shebeika has been able to stay in business due to the fact that customers are willing to pay for 
a higher quality meat (pers. comm., 2012). 
 
5.3.2.3 Contract farming 
 
Contract farming is not considered an interesting business opportunity since smallholders are 
not presumed to be reliable or efficient business partners (pers.comm. Ahmed, 2012).  
 
“While we produce 120000 birds per day, a smallholder might only have the capacity of 
10 000 birds in total. This makes their production systems very inefficient”. (pers.comm., 
Ahmed, 2012). 
 
Overall, autonomy and individualism was explained as the only way to make business in 
Sudan. Ahmed (pers.comm., 2012) also commented on the difference between other countries 
and Sudan. In countries with working infrastructure and independent external controllers, 
agribusinesses  have to act responsibly and a certain standard is guaranteed. Since Sudan does 
not provide a functioning system, controlling the quality work of the smallholders would 
require a lot of time and money. The only connection that Shebeika is willing to have with 
smallholders is the possibility to sell one day old chicks, if its egg production exceeds the 
agribusiness’s need. Even if contract farming would become interesting in the future, the 
agribusiness would never be willing to provide the smallholders with financial assets in the 
form of money. It might though consider providing other inputs such as feed and medical 
costs. 
 
“If you give them money, you never know for what they use them” (pers. Comm. Ahmed, 
2012). 
 
Another reason why the agribusiness does not cooperate with smallholders is explained by the 
unbalanced benefit from the parties. The agribusiness does not want to provide technical 
assistance, economical input or share its knowledge since it might mean that the smallholders 
will be dependent on the agribusiness, and by that time, the agribusiness will have lost many 
of its resources specificity (specific knowledge) and smallholders might become dangerous 
competitors instead. Shebeika has invested money in educating its personnel. It would be 
unwise to not use the competence that the workers have gained over the years. (pers.comm. 
Ahmed, 2012).  
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5.4 Smallholders perspective 
 
The table below is intended to give an overview of the smallholders’ 
situation. The authors found this information important to take into 
consideration for the analysis of the smallholders’ answers. Out of sixteen 
interviewed smallholders, representing eleven farms, only two were 
women. The table shows the number of chicks on the farms and the 
number of people interviewed and dependent of the production. The table 
also shows the education level as well as the dependency level of the 
production. 
 
Table 2. Brief overview of smallholders. 
 
Farm  Type of 
production 
system 
Produ
ction 
size 
Sex  Years 
within 
business 
Other 
Income 
Education 
level 
1  Closed  63000  Mix  >5  -  University 
diploma 
2  Closed  66000  Male  >15  -  University 
diploma 
3  Closed  35000  Male  >15  -  Elementry 
school 
4  Semi- 
closed 
22000  Male  >15  Soft 
ware 
High 
school 
5  Semi- 
closed 
16000  Male  >10  -  Elementry 
school 
6  Semi- 
closed 
8000  female  >10  farming  Elementry 
school 
7  Semi- 
closed 
2000  male  <5  teaching  Universtiy 
diploma 
8  Open  11000  male  >15  Farming  Elementry 
school 
9  Open  6000  male  >10  Periodic
income 
Elementry 
school 
10  Open  10000  male  <5  -  Elementry 
school 
11  Open  4000  male  >15  farming  Elementry 
school 
 
 
5.4.1 The production process 
 
The smallholders buy their chicks from one of the two large suppliers or at the market for 
current market price and transfer them in simple boxes, preferably at night to lower the 
mortality rate of the chicks during transportation. At the market, the farms also search for feed 
that mainly consists of domestic ingredients such as sesame seeds and durra. The birds are 
then raised in systems with an intense labor dependency. A veterinarian visits the farms to 
give the basic injections within the first ten days compared to the first day by the 
agribusinesses . The chicks are transported at day 45 to the slaughter house for slaughtering 
and are then returned to the smallholder. Figure 6 provides an illustration of the smallholders’ 
production process. Some of the smallholders transport the chicks themselves in their own or 27 
 
borrowed vans or cars while some slaughter houses offer transport for the chicks. It is then up 
to the smallholder to sell his products at the market. 
 
 
Figure 6. The production process of the smallholders (own interpretation) 
5.4.2 External relations 
 
The government seems to leave the smallholders in peace and does not interfere in the 
production process. Taxes and charges are not paid by the open housed systems since their 
production is not always registered while the largest closed systems are registered as 
agribusinesses  have to pay some agribusiness fees. The smallholders that also produce feed 
have at times been provided sorghum seeds for free by the government.  
Poor financial assets were a major problem faced by all the smallholders. Although the 
government often let these smallholders slip the controls and standards, financial security is 
needed to acquire inputs.  Smallholders 1 and 2 have obtained some financial help from the 
universities and are in return expected to provide university students with trainee work. None 
of the smallholders interviewed had financed their businesses by bank loans. This was 
explained by the high interest rate (12-14%) that makes the investment very expensive. 
Private financing by saving money during several years was the most common way to finance 
investments together with private loans from family members and friends. 
Two of the closed production systems and one semi closed farm were insured. Smallholders 
4, 6, 7 and 10 said that they would invest in insurance if they had a closed production system 
or a more advanced one since losing that would involve a greater financial risk. They did not 
seem to consider mortality because of diseases as a high enough risk factor to motivate 28 
 
insurance. One of the closed system smallholder did not have insurance because of religious 
reasons.  
The limited number of suppliers of chicks creates oligopoly market and the ability to raise 
chick prices. Since the smallholders are not able to import chicks from foreign countries they 
have to rely on hatcheries within the village. This has had several negative effects on the 
production.  Another problem is the high mortality rate of chicks during the transportation of 
chicks from the farm to the slaughter houses. Some of the smallholders solve this by 
transporting the chicks at night but during the summer season the heat can still be intense. 
According to smallholder 11 (pers.comm., 2012) one percent of the chicks die during the 
transportation to the farm or slaughter house. 
5.4.3 Contract Farming 
 
Most smallholders found contract farming an interesting business opportunity as long as the 
contracts are well written and suitable for their needs. Technical inputs were desired as well 
as help with the distribution of the products. They also see a working opportunity with an 
agribusiness as being a great experience to gain new network connections. Many smallholders 
have expressed that getting access to new technology is necessary, since new techniques 
could upgrade the production, leading to a better quality output. According to smallholder 5 
(pers.comm., 2012) he will not produce any meat if he is not sure that the market will buy his 
product. That is also why smallholder 5 along with other smallholders express that contract 
farming can solve this particular problem.  
The smallholders did not seem to think that knowledge transfer was needed and the ones 
negative towards the idea showed a fear of vertical integration or as they expressed it, the 
agribusinesses  interfering and trying to affect their routines and daily work. Most 
smallholders also expressed an anxiety of being cheated by the agribusinesses.  
Overall the higher educated smallholders gave longer and more detailed replies than the lower 
educated. The educated smallholders’ appeared more critical towards signing a contract 
agreement than the less educated smallholders. The smallholder with lower degree saw no 
negative effects with contract farming what so ever. According to smallholder 8 and 11, 
contract farming was the only way for the farm to expand. The smallholders with university 
education were aware of some negative effects of contract farming and expressed an 
unwillingness to lose their independency as a business. Another interesting point of view was 
the unwillingness towards letting an agribusiness to promote the smallholders’ production 
under the name of the agribusiness. This was motivated by the negative feeling of the 
agribusiness acting as a middleman to gain money on the work performed by the smallholder. 
Smallholder number 1 did not want someone else to take credit for his work since he was 
proud over his product. 
Different responses were also noted when interviewing men and women, the two women that 
were interviewed were confident and business minded. The women also gave extended replies 
and personal replies which were interesting for the authors since it led to interesting 
discussions and a more personal relationship was established. The male smallholders were 
proper with their replies and didn’t want to make any mistakes. 
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6. Analysis and discussion  
 
This chapter analyzes the empirical data obtained from the study in regards to the agency 
theory. The theory explains the behavior of the agent and the principal under a contract 
agreement with focus on the agency- and the risk-problem. In the case of contract farming, the 
agribusiness plays the role of the principal that has to rely on the work of the smallholder, also 
known as the agent, for its own profit. To overcome the agency and the risk problem, the 
agribusiness will want to control the smallholder’s work by strengthening the relation or 
offering attractive incentives for the smallholder to fulfill the agribusiness’s needs.  
The agency problem arises because of information asymmetry or in other words the 
principals’ limited ability to control and understand the agents’ hidden characteristics, 
knowledge and intentions. The agency problem relates to mistrust, opportunism and the 
humans incapability to be completely rationale. Limited ability for the principal to control the 
agent leads to opportunistic behavior in form of moral hazard or misinterpretations because of 
information asymmetry. The risk problem treats the parties’ differences in risk averseness 
depending on which party is taking the risk. The one taking the risk is usually more eager to 
avoid risk than the other party. 
The study intends to answer the following questions. This is done by comparing empirical 
data from interviews with published articles, official statistics and other data. 
1.  How are the market participants affected and responding to the current changes in the 
Sudanese poultry industry in Sudan today? 
2.  Under which conditions is contract farming an interesting business opportunity for 
large agribusinesses? 
3.  How can large agribusinesses  benefit from contracts with smallholders? 
4.  How would the agribusinesses provide assistance/benefits for the smallholders? 
5.  Under which conditions are smallholders interested in entering a contract agreement? 
 
 
6.1. Mistrust, affecting the attitudes towards collaboration 
 
As in several other African countries faced by war, corruption and poverty, mistrust is a major 
challenge to overcome affecting every part of the markets in Sudan. Abdelwahab at the CTC 
refers to his own experiences from working for the government. The government used to offer 
free seeds to secure food safety for the smallholders. The problem was that the smallholders 
sold part of the seed or used the land to grow cash crops for short term income. Poor control 
and management made the food safety plan unsustainable as cheating was not effectively 
recognized. Because of this the government nowadays is skeptical towards supporting 
smallholders in similar ways since it expects the smallholders to act opportunistically and 
irrationally once again (pers.comm. Abdelwahab, 2012). Similar behavior has been identified 
by Kontos (1990) when smallholders in the Gezira scheme acted opportunistically, trying to 
outsmart the system by renting out the land to subtenants or by overwatering their crops. 
On the other hand the universities, agribusinesses and the smallholders all show serious 
mistrust towards the government. Even Abdelwahab at the CTC confirms that the work of the 
agricultural extension service is unsatisfactory, especially towards smallholders as it has let 
them down. Technical assistance is not offered to an adequate extent and large agribusinesses 30 
 
are preferred as land tenants. This is also confirmed by Yousif, dean of animal production at 
Khartoum University.  
Also, the agribusinesses relation with smallholders is tensed. This can be explained by land 
issues were the smallholders do not respect boundaries and contracts. The agribusinesses also 
have little faith in the smallholders’ abilities to manage their farms in bio-secure and efficient 
ways. According to the agribusinesses, smallholders that are not able to manage their farms 
properly run the risk of spreading disease and epidemics that end up hurting everyone 
involved. Ahmed, technical manager at Shebeika, describes an unwillingness to enter 
contracts with smallholders because of the costs that would arise due to control issues. He 
would not be willing to provide money to a smallholder since he would lose control over how 
it is used. The explanation for this is the agribusinesses’ mistrust of smallholders’ intentions. 
If Shebeika and Arabia poultry support smallholders with sorghum for chicken feed, there is 
no guarantee that the feed will go to chicken production. Since there is a shortage of sorghum 
due to rise in demand for human consumption, it is attractive to sell the seeds provided and 
outsmarting the agribusinesses. That’s a risk agribusinesses do not want to take.  
The lack of trust in others makes cooperating in the form of contract farming, very expensive 
for the principal since the extent of control would be large (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moral hazard 
on part of the smallholder is expected by Arabia and Shebeika that’s why the agribusinesses 
try to only depend on themselves. This decision could be explained by the agribusinesses’ 
beliefs that it would be non-cost-efficient to monitor the smallholders every step (Adams, 
1996).  
6.2 Avoiding government interference 
 
Smallholders could help the agribusinesses to overcome some of the problems that the 
government might create for the agribusinesses since contract farming could be more socially 
accepted (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). While the agribusinesses expressed problems with 
government interfering with business, the smallholder respondents had so far been left in 
peace. The agribusinesses could avoid problems with the government since part of the assets 
would be written on the smallholders. Contract farming could also be cost efficient as the 
agribusiness will save money on staff training, and behavioral payment (Eaton and Shepherd, 
2001). Although, the unstable political situation and bad experiences from earlier projects are 
making the positive effects of profits appearing small and too uncertain to be considered 
interesting business opportunities for the agribusinesses today. Moreover Ahmed (pers. 
comm., 2012) explained that much of these training costs had already been invested in the 
people that work for the business today. To train smallholders to do the same job would be a 
lack of investment. 
The agribusinesses attitudes towards being independent are based upon several reasons. 
Firstly, the relationship with the government is tense. The government is a stakeholder in one 
large poultry producer Mico, and debatable regulations create apparent problems for the other 
agribusinesses that try to compete with Mico. Both Arabia and Shebeika, mention that as soon 
as a smallholder enters a contract agreement with an agribusiness, the government will 
interfere and complicate the cooperation. Contract farming is described as initiatives taken by 
agribusinesses to secure access to smallholders’ production. However, it is difficult to create 
and believe in change when the government refuses to support any idea (Coulter, 1999). 
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6.3 When problems are larger than benefits 
 
Both Shebeika and Arabia poultry see no satisfactory benefits of entering a contract 
agreement due to many reasons. Firstly, they assume that management standards would 
dissolve. With the high control of bio-security that Arabia and Shebeika poultry have, they 
believe that smallholders due to poor knowledge won’t be as careful. Arabia and Shebeika 
have put a lot of time and money into training employees to do the job correctly. They see no 
benefits in starting all over again.  
“The job is done better if it’s done by the agribusiness itself” -Ahmed, technical manager 
Shebeika Poultry. 
The idea that cooperation with small farms would be expensive has been found to affect the 
agribusinesses attitude towards contract farming (Sethboonsarng, 2008). Shebeika and Arabia 
produce 7-15 thousand ton of poultry meat a day and have capacities of mass production and 
high quality. For an agribusiness to start a contract agreement with a smallholder whom has 
very limited capacity for safe and effective production would be a vast and tedious project for 
both parties (pers., comm., Altigani, 2012). 
 
6.4 “Safe” business excludes the poor 
 
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) point out the large need for financial, technical and capacity input 
that the agribusinesses would have to provide for the smallholder to establish a sustainable 
contract agreement. In developing countries the input from the agribusiness generally has to 
be higher than in developed countries. In the case of poultry production in Khartoum the 
smallholders will not be interesting business partners unless they produce in closed systems. 
Since the smallholders lack the financial assets to invest in closed production systems, and the 
agribusinesses seem unwilling to provide these assets; the evolution as well as the cooperation 
seems to be immobile. Key and Runsten (1999) find that the preference of agribusinesses to 
collaborate with large smallholders is one of the main concerns regarding contract farming. 
This would imply that Shebeika and Arabia could only consider to work with farm 1,2 or 3 
that already operate closed production systems. These farms are in theory the ones with less 
need for help. 
 
6.5 Imbalanced power relations 
 
Some of the smallholders are willing to sign a contract if the agribusiness provides them with 
the inputs they feel that they need, such as technical assets, credit. According to a few 
smallholders, entering a contract agreement is also a big risk for them as it could mean that 
they will not be able to grow as independent businesses if they produce for an agribusiness. 
Some smallholders dream of having their own agribusiness one day. By agreeing upon a 
contract, this commitment would limit the smallholders’ chance of developing their own 
ideas. To exit a contract agreement would be even harder for a smallholder because they are 
dependent on the agribusinesses ’ inputs. This dependence further leads to the agribusiness 
controlling the smallholder instead of working together. 32 
 
Most smallholders also see the risk of being cheated with a contract agreement. Since many 
smallholders can’t afford lawyers to look through the contract, they feel there is a great 
chance for manipulation. As smallholder 1,expressed it: 
 
“Me, as a smallholder, I want to grow, and make my own farm bigger one day. To work 
through a contract is a good way for me to gain more experience, knowledge and network 
connection. but what happens when I want to exit the contract? Can you secure for me that 
the agribusiness will not hassle me? I’m a small farmer with very little connection, while the 
agribusinesses are ten times my size and for sure have more connections. To start a problem 
with them could mean the end of my farming career”. 33 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This study was intended to investigate whether or not contract farming was considered an 
interesting business opportunity for poultry producers in Sudan and a mean to let smallholders 
participate on a larger market. The concrete answer to this question is no. Contract farming 
between smallholders and agribusiness poultry producers is not seen as an ideal business 
opportunity for either party. This implies that little collaboration will take place without the 
interference or incentives created from a third party. As long as Sudan continues to be 
politically unstable and corruption continues to play a major role in business, neither the 
agribusinesses nor the smallholders can count on the government or extension services to 
solve their problems. However, contrary to the smallholder and agribusiness perspective, both 
the universities’ staff and the production manager at the CTC welcome contract farming as an 
interesting option. Although contract farming could be considered important for smallholders 
in the Sudan, the critical aspects require much effort to overcome. Although contract farming 
could be considered important for smallholders in Sudan, the critical aspects require much 
effort to overcome.  
When looking at the situation from an agency theory perspective, we presume that the 
agribusinesses and the smallholders’ different views are due to different risk averseness and 
the risk perceived by the parties. The university professors and the government are able to 
refer to the implementation of contract farming as an experiment, because they put little at 
risk themselves. As the agribusinesses and the smallholders are the ones whose incomes 
depend on the production effectiveness, they are less eager to spend money on new projects. 
Also, the time frame of a project is important. If a project is non-successful after a few years, 
the government can simply refer to it as a failure and move on. However, a smallholder might 
lose his entire business and have obtained large debts within a short period of time. For 
contract farming to be a sustainable solution to market failure in Sudan, strong involvement 
and commitment from both smallholders and agribusinesses are essential. 
The differences in quality, price and service offered to the customers has created two separate 
production chains where large agribusinesses reach the most attractive markets and 
smallholders mainly fill the supply-demand gap as the agribusinesses are still not able to 
satisfy the growing demand. In this study, mistrust and poor infrastructure has been central 
explanations to the current relations between agribusinesses and smallholders. This mistrust is 
due to the underlying reasons explained above. The few extension services that are offered are 
met by suspicion and the same negative attitude was noted towards cooperation and contract 
farming. On the one hand, we hear the agribusinesses explanations for their unwillingness to 
depend upon others. Traditional reasons and bad examples are easily used to explain the 
negative points made. We can also understand that expected problems with biosecurity and 
moral hazard with smallholders scare agribusinesses off. On the other hand, someone needs to 
take a first step towards improving an infected business environment. The chance of getting 
smallholders to listen and accept offers from large agribusinesses is greater than the other way 
around. As stated above, the initiative has to come from the larger institutions. 
 
7.1 Outlook 
 
A growing urban population is dependent on the agricultural produce from the rest of the 
country. The current situation, with a war in Darfur has put the country’s most arable land 
incapable of contributing efficiently to agricultural produce. If competing with animal 34 
 
consumption, human consumption will always come first. This means that the rise in food 
prices for humans has affected the rise in the price for animal consumption as well since the 
land left for the growth of animal feed is taken over by the produce for human consumption. 
As stated above, the feed cost is up to 70% of the poultry producers’ total production costs. 
As a result, stabilizing feed price and securing the availability of the feed, during the year 
would be an important way to ease the poultry producers’ economic situation. This study 
focused on the possibility of small poultry producers to produce poultry through a contract 
agreement with a large agribusinesses in order to secure an income. At the end of this project, 
we have noted time after time a need for feed and storage possibilities. For future studies we 
see a possibility for contract farming where smallholder agriculturalists specialize in poultry 
feed production such as maize or soy beans. By helping smallholders to specialize in these 
crops the agribusiness would become less independent on expensive imported feed and less 
dependent on external currency. This would also make the smallholders more attractive 
contract partners rather than a competitor.  35 
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Appendix 1: Interview with Universities 
 
Date: 
Time: 
Place: 
Name of person interviewed: 
Position: 
Type of organisation: 
Poultry industry in Sudan 
1.  What is the market outlook for the poultry industry in Sudan? 
2.  What are the challenges faced by agribusiness poultry producers? 
3.  What opportunities do the agribusiness poultry producers have? 
4.  What are the challenges faced by smallholder poultry producers? 
5.  What opportunities do the smallholder poultry producers have? 
6.  Are there existing policy promoting/supporting the poultry industry development or 
hindering it? 
Contract Farming 
7.  Do you see any current potential for contract farming in the poultry business in the 
Umdurman region? Why?, Why not? 
8.  What do you believe to be the greatest difference between the smallholders and the 
large companies when it comes to developing their businesses? 
Economic difference?Networks connection and network size? Education? 
9.  Are small holders well included in the poultry business today? 
10. How do smallholders access a larger market? (Regional, national, international) 
Interest organizations?, Other? 
11. How would small holders access  the larger market if they do not produce under 
contract?  
12. How could contract farming be successfully implemented in Khartoum? 
13. What benefits do small holders have when it comes to production?  
For ex. Become aware of sick individuals at an earliy stage? 
14. What is the biggest concearn in the industry today? 
15. What do you think could be difficult in finding an agreement on a contract, between 
agribusiness and smallholder? Do you think it will be difficult for smallholders and 
agribusinesses to agree on a contract were both parties are satisfied? 
16. What would be an ideal setup for contract farming in the Sudanese poultry industry?  
17. How would you implement contract farming today? 41 
 
Appendix 2: Interview with Universities 
 
Date: 
Name of person interviewed: 
Position:  
Type of organization:  
Email address:  
 
Poultry industry in Sudan 
1.  What role does the ministry play in supporting agribusinesses and smallholders? 
 
2.  How is the agricultural extension organized? 
 
3.  How would you describe the ministry’s policy towards the private sector? (agribusinesses and 
smallholders) 
 
4.  Are there existing policies promoting/supporting the poultry industry development or hindering 
it? 
5.  Would you consider smallholders well included in the poultry business today? 
 
6.  What opportunities do the agribusiness poultry producers have? 
 
7.  What are the challenges faced by agribusiness poultry producers? 
 
8.  What are the challenges faced by smallholder poultry producers? 
 
9.  What opportunities do the smallholder poultry producers have? 
 
10. Do you consider contract farming as being a possibility for the poultry business in Sudan? 
Why?, Why not?  
 
11. How would small holders access the larger market if they do not produce under contract?  
   42 
 
Appendix 3: Interview with Companies 
 
Background_______________________________________________________________________ 
1.  When was the business founded? 
2.  What’s your main goal? 
3.  How do you operate to reach your goals? 
4.  How much is your yearly revenue?  
5.  How many employers do you have? 
6.  Do have any quality certification, if so what are the demands?  
 
Current production__________________________________________________________ 
7.  How does your production process work? 
8.  Who is your main customer today? 
9.  Do you export part of your production? 
10. Do you co-operate with other organizations today? How? 
11. How do you collaborate with the government   
12. Are there any requirements from the government that you must fulfill?  
 
Contract Farming___________________________________________________________ 
13. Do you see benefits from entering contracts with small holders today or in the future? 
-  Why?  
-  Why not? 
 
14. What are your major concerns with entering a contract agreement? 
 
15. How can smallholders change its way of managing their business to become an interesting 
business partner? 
 
16. What are you willing to provide for smallholders? 
 
17. Do you find smallholders trustworthy as business partners? 
-  Why? 
-  Why not? 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire Smallholders 
 
Time: 
Place: 
Name of person interviewed: 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATISTICS 
Gender…………………………………………………... 
Age of respondent………………………………………. 
Household size………………………………………….. 
Education level …………………………………………. 
Profession/Occupation   ……………………………….. 
Main income generating activities  ……………………… 
 BACKGROUND 
1.  Why did you decide to produce poultry? 
 
2.  For how long have you been in the industry?  
 
3.  Is the family depending on other income?  
 
 
PRODUCTION SIZE 
 
4.  How many chickens do you have? 
 
5.  Do you keep record of your production? (i.e. mortality rate etc.) 
 
6.  How is the farm financed? 
 
7.  Do you plan to invest in your production? 
 
8.  How will you execute your investment plans? 
 
9.  Are you part of a cooperative or other organized group for poultry production and 
sales? 
 
10. Do you have insurance for your production? If, not why? 
 
11. Are there any requirements from the government that you must fulfill? 
 
 
NETWORK RELATIONS 
 
12.  Who is the buyer? 
 
13. How extended is your relationship to the buyer? 44 
 
 
14. Who provides you with chickens? 
 
15. How extended is your relationship to the provider? 
 
16. From whom do you buy food and other input for the chickens? 
 
17. How do you get production to the place of sales? 
 
18. Do you face any problems in poultry production? What are the problems? 
 
19. How do you solve the problems? 
 
20. How is the work load divided between family members?  
 
CONTRACT FARMING 
 
21. Have you heard of contract farming before? If, yes how? 
 
22. Would you consider contract farming an interesting business opportunity?  
 
23. What do you think that a large poultry company could assist you with if you enter a 
contract agreement with them?  
 
24. Would you be willing to set a future price for the chicks you sell in order to eliminate 
price risk? If, yes for what duration? 
 
25. What is your greatest concern about entering a contract agreement?  
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire Smallholders (Arabic 
version) 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 